国外坦克装甲车辆主动防护系统

从陆军装甲主动防护系统的产生、发展和应用进行了阐述;对陆军装甲主动防护系统的国际通用分类、应用现状及发展现状进行了分类介绍;就国际几种典型的陆军装甲主动防护系统进行了详细介绍;最后就陆军装甲主动防护系统进行了发展和应用前景的分析。     

From the sea to outer space: The command of space as the foundation of spacepower theory

Colin Gray once lamented the absence of a ‘Mahan for the final frontier’ and spacepower theory in strategic studies. This article proposes the command of space as the fundamental concept of spacepower theory, and that Mahan himself has much to offer in the endeavour of spacepower theory-making than has hitherto been realised. The theory is advanced by tempering versions of the ‘command of space’, stressing its educational intent, and explaining the nuanced sub-concepts of space control and denial through understanding some precedents set by seapower theory. In the process, aspects of Mahanian and Corbettian seapower theory are unified.     

基于欺骗的网络主动防御技术研究

针对网络对抗和计算机网络安全防护的现实需求,提出了一种在分布式欺骗空间中实施多重欺骗的网络主动防御技术,通过仿真常用的网络服务程序以及伪造安全漏洞来诱骗入侵者,利用内核级操作控制、文件系统镜像和信息欺骗,构建基于Windows和Linux平台的欺骗性操作环境,实现了对网络入侵全过程的欺骗、监视与控制.该技术突破了普通蜜罐技术单一欺骗层次的局限性,使得欺骗性、交互性和安全性同时得到明显提高.     

基于未确知测度的多目标决策方法及其应用

定义策略、目标和评判三个空间以及满足非负性、归一性和可加性的未确知测度函数,给出了适合于有序分割类评判空间寻优的最优决策准则,从而提出了一种未确知信息数学处理理论基础上的未确知测度决策方法,对含多因素特别是难以量化因素的决策问题寻优建立了一个合理、精细、分辨率高、计算简单高效的数学模型,用来求解多目标决策问题中的最优策略,并结合火力打击选择的一个实例分析,获得了较为成功的应用.     

目次

为改善等离子体合成射流激励器在稀薄空气环境中的控制效果,增强其临近空间环境适应性,开展了腔体增压条件下激励器工作特性的研究。建立了腔体增压效果理论分析模型,计算结果表明:采用高压气源供气可以较好地提升激励器腔体气压,并且腔体气压对高压气源气压具有较好的跟随性,从而为射流强度调节提供了一种新的方式。搭建了腔体增压等离子体合成射流激励器实验系统,开展了腔体增压压力和射流流场特性测量,实验测量结果与计算结果吻合良好,误差小于2.6%。高速纹影观测显示:在腔体增压作用下,激励器控制力得到显著改善,射流锋面峰值速度由256 m/s提升至507 m/s。     

The Afghan model in northern Iraq

In Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, as the Coalition's heavy forces fought in the South, in the North a handful of special operations forces, working with Kurdish rebels, clashed with the Iraqi army along the Green Line. In operations reminiscent of those used a year earlier to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, the lightly armed and heavily outnumbered Coalition forces called in air strikes to defeat Iraq's regular and Republican Guard army divisions. This article tells the story of these operations and discusses some of their implications for future US military policy. The success of the Afghan model in Iraq goes a long way toward demonstrating the efficacy of new air-heavy tactics and shows the strategic value of using light indigenous allies to replace heavy US land forces in both conventional combat and occupation operations.     

Westmoreland was right: learning the wrong lessons from the Vietnam War

Fourth Generation Warfare is a theory of contemporary warfare that posits a number of different ideas that are able to shed light on current conflicts. Whilst much of the debate has been concentrated on the linear development of warfare and also on analysis of the current situation of US forces in Iraq, it has resonance for a number of different conflicts taking place in Africa, if only because the US has become involved in contemporary conflicts in Somalia and the Mahgreb. There are clearly significant issues with the US-centric, flawed linear approach to history, but the actual analysis of modes of warfare has much to offer policymakers in a continent that is under-represented in the literature, and is also in danger of being forgotten in the shadow of analysis of Iraq. This paper moves on from criticising the stepped approach to history and looks at patterns of warfare in contemporary Africa, arguing that there is much in the theory that could be used to explain seemingly illogical tactics or patterns, and thus has much to tell policymakers engaged in conflict analysis.

Rebellions can be made 2 per cent active in a striking force, and 98 per cent passively sympathetic.1 ?1. T.E. Lawrence, ‘Science of Guerrilla Warfare’, 1929, published in Malcolm Brown (ed) T.E. Lawrence in War and Peace: An Anthology of the Military Writings of Lawrence of Arabia (London: Greenhill Books, 2005) p.284.      

Unnecessary or unsung? The utilisation of airpower in Britain's colonial counterinsurgencies

Making extensive use of primary archival documents, this article seeks to explore whether airpower in three of Britain's most significant post-war colonial counterinsurgency campaigns, Malaya, Kenya and South Arabia, was an unnecessary part of British strategy, offering little useful military force due to the futility and strategic damage rendered by offensive bombardment, or whether airpower was indeed an unsung factor that provided operational flexibility through its effectiveness in a supply context, as well as its intelligence role in providing valuable aerial reconnaissance. In all three case studies the role played by the RAF in medical evacuations, in troop drops, in crop spraying during food-denial initiatives, and in providing ‘Voice Aircraft’ for the propaganda campaign, provide insights into an under-explored component of Britain's politico-military efforts in counterinsurgency in the 1950s and 1960s and suggests that the main strategic value of airpower in counterinsurgency, then and now, lies in its non-kinetic functions.     

Winning with warlords in Afghanistan

A fundamental contradiction has been built into America's intervention in Afghanistan since the first days of the war in 2001. On the one hand, US policymakers have viewed the promotion of liberal democracy, economic development, and strong centralized state institutions as essential to achieve victory over the long term. On the other hand, however, the US has relied on local warlords to win its battles against the Taliban from the first days of the intervention. The Obama administration's tortured policy review reflects the intractable dilemmas involved in trying to build a modern democratic state while relying on local warlords as crucial allies in the war against the Taliban.     

Controlled warfare: how directed-energy weapons will enable the US Military to fight effectively in an urban environment while minimizing collateral damage

US military operations are increasingly conducted within urban environments and with these operations come the risk of increasing the number of civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. The use of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, is one method for minimizing collateral damage. This method enables US military forces to effectively fight within urban environments through force escalation capabilities. Using a series of historical examples and future scenarios for urban warfare, this article highlights deficiencies affecting military capabilities in military urban operations, addresses the consequences of collateral damage, assesses the effectiveness of directed-energy weapons in military urban operations and encourages further funding, research and integration of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, within the US military.